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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In a previous article in this journal, one of the authors surveyed the long history of the 
debate between proponents of the Arm’s Length Standard (“ALS”) and formulary 
apportionment and suggested that perhaps this debate is more about semantics than 
substance.2F3 Specifically, the author suggested that in situations where comparables 
could not be found, it may be advisable under the profit split method to use formulas 
to allocate the residual profit left over after a standard rate of return is assigned to 
                                                 
1 Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law and Director, International Tax LLM Program, the University of 
Michigan. 
2 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This research was made 
possible thanks to the generous support of the European Commission's Marie Curie International 
Reintegration Grants program.  
The authors wish to thank Yariv Brauner, YaronLahav, Debra Lefler, and Suzan Morse for all their 
helpful comments. 
3 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Between Formulary Apportionment and the OECD Guidelines: A Proposal for 
Reconciliation, 2 WTJ 3 (2010).  
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routine functions, and that this is an acceptable use of formulary methods in an ALS 
context. 
 
This article tries to persuade tax policymakers that the formulary “demon” offers an 
overall improvement to the current transfer pricing regime. It seeks to re-examine the 
formulary alternative by inquiring whether partial integration of formulary concepts 
into current practices would offer a reasonable alternative to transfer pricing rules.  
 
It is not our intention to come up with a panacea of how to solve all the problems, or 
even to come with a new proposal. Instead this article wishes to open a free-of-
prejudice debate on how to best promote international tax policy, without sticking to 
labels. It advances an outcomes based result to answer the key question of what is the 
best way to achieve equitable and efficient allocation of MNE income. 
 
As in the previous paper, we believe that the key to answering this question is to 
resolve the problem of the residual, i.e., how to allocate income generated from 
mobile assets and activities whose risks are born collectively by the entire MNE 
group. This reflects our belief that these assets and activities generate most of current 
transfer pricing compliance and administrative costs, as well as tax avoidance 
opportunities. A limited formulary tax regime that allocates only the residual portion 
of MNE income, may therefore offer significant advantages. Furthermore, such a 
regime would not require significant deviation from current practices, or substantial 
modifications in the international tax regime. 
 
Part of the solution is to stop viewing the ALS and formulary arrangements as binary 
alternatives. Instead of sticking to acronyms, policymakers need to embark on a long 
journey of finding the middle path through small incremental trials and errors. 
Ultimately, this journey will lead to a hybrid tax regime which incorporates elements 
from both ALS (preferably, a tougher version of the CPM) for situations in which 
good comparables exist and formulary arrangements for the hard-to-source residual 
where there are no comparables. 
 
This is not a utopian but rather a real world solution–a one that does not require full 
cooperation among countries or reformulation of the entire international tax regime. 
We believe that the OECD should take a leading role in this direction, as it has started 
doing by accepting the profit-based methods as equal to the traditional ones under the 
ALS. 
 
I. WHY THE TRANSFER PRICING REGIME IS NOT WORKING AND CANNOT WORK 
 
A. The Basics of Current Transfer Pricing Conventions3F4 
 
Under the current tax system, multinational firms (both resident and non-resident) pay 
tax to the U.S. government based on the income that they report earning in the United 
States. As is typical, the United States employs a separate accounting system, under 
which firms account for income and expenses in each country separately. The U.S. 
                                                 
4 This part and the next one are based on Avi-Yonah, Clausing and Durst, Allocating Business Profits 
for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 Fla. Tax Rev. 497 (2009). 
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statutory corporate tax rate of 35%has been increasing relative to other OECD 
countries over the previous 15 years.   
 
 As an example, consider a U.S. based multinational firm that operates a 
subsidiary in Ireland. Assume that the U.S. corporate income tax rate is 35% while the 
Irish corporate income tax rate is 12.5%. The Irish subsidiary earns €800 and decides 
to repatriate €70 of the profits to the United States. (Assume, for ease of computation 
only, a 1:1 exchange rate.)  First, the Irish affiliate pays €100 to the Irish government 
on profits of €800. It then repatriates $70 to the United States, using the remaining 
profit (€630) to reinvest in its Irish operations. The firm must pay U.S. tax on the 
repatriated income, but it is generally eligible for a tax credit of $100 (taxes paid) 
times 70/700 (the ratio of dividends to after-tax profits), or $10. 4F5 Owing to deferral, 
the remaining profits (€630) can grow abroad tax-free prior to repatriation.   
This system creates a clear incentive to earn profits in low-tax countries. Firms 
may respond by locating real activities (jobs, assets, production) in low-tax countries. 
In addition, firms respond with various legal and accounting techniques to shift profits 
to low-tax locations, disproportionately to the scale of business activities in such 
locations. There are multiple such ways to shift income to subsidiaries in low-tax 
countries. For example, it may be advantageous for multinational firms to alter the 
debt/equity ratios of affiliated firms in high and low-tax countries in order to 
maximize interest deductions in high-tax countries and taxable profits in low-tax 
countries. Further, multinational firms have an incentive to distort the prices on intra-
firm transactions in order to shift income to low-tax locations. For example, firms can 
follow a strategy of under- (over-) pricing intra-firm exports (imports) to (from) low-
tax countries, following the opposite strategy with respect to high-tax countries. The 
most powerful of such techniques typically involve the transfer of interests in 
intangible property, such as patents, copyrights and trademarks as well as unpatented 
know-how, to subsidiaries in low-tax countries. 
 
 
B. Why It Is Broken—the Income Leakage and Compliance Cost of the Transfer 
Pricing Regime 
  
In theory, firms should be limited in their ability to engage in tax-motivated 
transfer pricing by government enforcement of existing transfer pricing laws. 
Governments generally require MNEs to price intrafirm transactions according to the 
ALS—as if they were occurring with an unrelated party. At the heart of the ALS, is 
the assumption that each affiliated company within the group transacts with the other 
members of the group in the same way that it would transact if the members were 
unrelated. That central assumption defies reality, and it is not surprising such a system 
cannot yield sensible results. 
 The porosity of current transfer pricing rules creates an artificial tax incentive 
to locate profits in low-tax countries, both by locating real economic activities in such 
countries and by shifting profits for tax purposes toward more lightly taxed locations. 
It is apparent that U.S. multinational firms book disproportionate amounts of profit in 
low-tax locations. For example, Figure 1 shows the ten highest-profit locations for 
U.S. multinational firms in 2005, based on the share of worldwide (non-U.S.) profits 
                                                 
5. In general, under the U.S. tax system, when a non-U.S. subsidiary distributes income to a 
U.S. parent through a dividend, the U.S. parent is entitled to a credit, against U.S. taxes for taxes paid 
out of the distributed income to a foreign government. 
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earned in each location. While some of the countries are places with a large U.S. 
presence in terms of economic activity (the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, 
Japan), seven of the top-ten profit countries are locations with very low effective tax 
rates. 
 
Figure 1: Where Were the Profits in 2005? 
(profits as a percentage of the worldwide total) 
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Country Effective Tax Rate 
Netherlands 5.1% 
Luxembourg 0.9% 
United Kingdom 28.9% 
Bermuda 0.9% 
Ireland 5.9% 
Switzerland 3.5% 
Canada 21.4% 
Singapore 3.2% 
U.K. Islands 1.9% 
Belgium 8.7% 
 
Notes: In 2005, majority-owned affiliates of U.S. multinational firms earned $336 billion of 
net income. This figure shows percentages of the worldwide (non-U.S.) total net income 
occurring in each of the top-10 income countries. Thus, each percentage point translates into 
approximately $3.4 billion of net income. Effective tax rates are calculated as foreign income 
taxes paid relative to net (pre-tax) income. Data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA) web page; 2005 is the most recent year with revised data available. The Bureau of 
Economic Analysis conducts annual surveys of Operations of U.S. Parent Companies and 
Their Foreign Affiliates. 
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The literature has consistently found that multinational firms are sensitive to 
corporate tax rate differences across countries in their financial decisions. Estimates 
from the literature suggest that the tax base responds to changes in the corporate tax 
rate with an average semi-elasticity of about -2; thus, countries with high corporate 
tax rates are likely to gain revenue by lowering their tax rate. 5F6 One recent study 
suggests that corporate income tax revenues in the United States were approximately 
35% lower due to income shifting in 2004. 6F7Also, the literature suggests a substantial 
responsiveness of real economic activities to tax rate differences among countries. 7F8 
These findings imply both less activity in United States and less tax revenue for the 
U.S. government. However, the tax responsiveness of real activity is less immediately 
apparent in the data. For example, Figure 2 shows the top ten employment locations 
for U.S. multinational firms in 2005, based on the share of worldwide (non-U.S.) 
employment in each location. The high employment countries are the usual suspects – 
large economies with close economic ties to the United States. As the accompanying 
table indicates, tax rates are not particularly low for this set of countries.  
 
                                                 
6. See Ruud de Mooij and Sjef Ederveen, "Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment: A 
Synthesis of Empirical Research," International Tax and Public Finance 10, no. 6, Nov. 2003, at 673-
693, and de Mooij, Ruud A. Will corporate income taxation survive? De Economist 153: 277-301 
(2005) for an overview of this literature. 
7. This estimate is from Kimberly A. Clausing, Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance and Tax 
Policy, 62 NAT'L TAX J. 703, 721 (2009). The calculation is based on a regression of U.S. 
multinational firm affiliate profit rates on tax rate differences across countries.  
8. See de Mooij and Ederveen, supra. 
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Figure 2: Where Were the Jobs in 2005? 
(employment as a percentage of the worldwide total) 
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Country Effective Tax Rate 
United Kingdom 28.9% 
Canada 21.4% 
Mexico 21.8% 
Germany 26.2% 
France 21.3% 
China 14.8% 
Brazil 18.1% 
Australia 12.1% 
Japan 34.7% 
Italy 24.9% 
 
 
Notes: In 2005, majority-owned affiliates of U.S. multinational firms employed 9.1 
million employees. This figure shows percentages of the worldwide (non-U.S.) total 
employment occurring in each of the top-10 countries. Thus, each percentage point translates 
into approximately 91,000 jobs. Effective tax rates are calculated as foreign income taxes paid 
relative to net (pre-tax) income. Data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) web 
page; 2005 is the most recent year with revised data available. The Bureau of Economic 
Analysis conducts annual surveys of Operations of U.S. Parent Companies and Their Foreign 
Affiliates. 
 
 
Third, the current system is absurdly complex. As Taylor notes, observers 
have described the system as “a cumbersome creation of stupefying complexity” with 
“rules that lack coherence and often work at cross purposes.”8F9 Altshuler notes that 
observers testifying before the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform 
                                                 
Taylor, Willard. 2005. Testimony before the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform 
(March 31). In Tax Notes (April 4; Doc 2005-6654). 
http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/meetings/docs/willard.ppt#257,1, Presentation.9  
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found the system “deeply, deeply flawed,” noting that “it is difficult to overstate the 
crisis in the administration of the international tax system of the United States.”9F10 
Current transfer pricing rules have spawned a huge industry of lawyers, accountants 
and economists whose professional role is to assist multinational companies in their 
transfer pricing planning and compliance. 
Finally, it is important to note that the problems with the current system derive 
not from rules at its periphery, but instead from a fallacy that lies at the system’s 
central core: namely, the belief that transactions among unrelated parties can be found 
and that they can be used as meaningful benchmarks for tax compliance and 
enforcement. 10F11  
Such an approach might well have made sense eighty years ago, when the 
legislative language underlying today’s arm’s length standard for income tax purposes 
was first developed. 11F12 At that time, although multinational groups existed, available 
transportation and communications technology did not permit close centralized 
management of geographically dispersed groups. Therefore, members of 
multinational groups functioned largely as independent entities, and benchmarking 
their incomes or transactions based on uncontrolled comparables probably made good 
sense. 
That situation changed, however, with the technological changes precipitated 
by the Second World War. Today, it is possible to exercise close managerial control 
over multinational groups, and these groups develop in all industries and geographic 
market segments in which the efficiencies of common control pose significant 
economic advantages. Moreover, in those industries and markets where common 
control poses advantages, it is typically economically infeasible to remain in the 
market using a non-commonly controlled structure (for example, by maintaining 
distributors that are economically independent of manufacturers). Therefore, in those 
markets in which multinational groups operate – that is, in those markets in which 
transfer pricing issues arise – it is unlikely that reasonably close “uncontrolled 
comparables” can easily be found. 
                                                 
Altshuler, Rosanne. 2005. International aspects of recommendations from the President's Advisory 
Panel on Federal Tax Reform. Paper presented at Tax Reform in an Open Economy, Brookings 
Institution, Washington, DC (December 2). http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20051202tax.pdf, 
p. 12.10  
11. This argument is presented in detail in e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah "The Rise and Fall of 
Arm's Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation." Finance and Tax Law 
Review 9:310 (updated version of article from 1995 Virginia Tax Rev. 15:80) (2006). See also,  
e.g., Stanley I. Langbein "The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm's Length." Tax Notes 
30:625 (1986), and Michael C. Durst & Robert E. Culbertson Clearing Away the Sand: 
Retrospective Methods and Prospective Documentation in Transfer Pricing Today." Tax Law 
Rev. 57. 37-84 (2003). 
 
. For example, if one wants to determine the “arm’s length” level of profitability of a U.S. 
distribution subsidiary of a foreign manufacturer of automobiles, one identifies one or more 
independent U.S. distributors of automobiles operating in economically, similar circumstances and uses 
the income of the independent distributor or distributors to benchmark the income of the U.S. 
subsidiary. 
12. For historical summaries see, e.g.,  Avi-Yonah, Rise and Fall, supra; Langbein "The 
Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm's Length", supra; Durst &  Culbertson Clearing Away the 
Sand", supra).  
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This is true of virtually every other industry that is conducted on a large global 
scale. In sum, no matter how assiduously one performs “functional analyses” 
designed to identify “uncontrolled comparables” that are reasonably similar to 
members of multinational groups, one is rarely going to find them. Certainly, such 
comparables will not be – and have not been – found with sufficient regularity to 
serve as the basis for a workable transfer pricing system. If the transfer pricing rules 
are going to be made tolerably administrable, policymakers around the world will 
need to restate them on a basis other than that of reliance on uncontrolled 
comparables. 
The results of the current system, which assumes the availability of useful 
comparables in an economic environment where they are very unlikely to be found, 
are predictable: 
(i) Companies and the government spend extraordinary sums each year on 
efforts at compliance and enforcement, largely through the preparation of 
“contemporaneous documentation”12F13 by taxpayers and attempts at comprehensive 
examinations by the IRS involving some of the Service’s most experienced and 
skilled personnel. 
(ii) Despite the expense of compliance and enforcement, companies and the 
IRS typically are dramatically far apart in their determinations of arm’s length 
pricing. Controversies routinely involve hundreds of millions of dollars and are 
resolved at amounts that resemble neither the government’s nor the taxpayer’s 
positions, thereby casting grave doubt on the conceptual soundness of the underlying 
rules.13F14 
(iii) The inability to predict whether their positions will be sustained leaves 
companies and their investors with large areas of uncertainty in their financial 
statements.   
(iv) The absence of clear standards for compliance, coupled with the ability 
under the arm’s length standard to apportion income to low-tax countries through 
legal arrangements governing the sitting of intangibles and (more recently) the 
bearing of risk, make it impossible for governments to predict with reasonable 
accuracy their actual amount of corporate tax revenue. 14F15 
                                                 
13. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6.  
14. A 1992 study by the General Accounting Office concluded that less than 30% of transfer 
pricing adjustments proposed by IRS examiners ultimately were upheld in subsequent proceedings.  
Similarly, in a recent multibillion dollar case settled out of court, the parties agreed on payment of 3.4 
billion in settlement of pending transfer pricing claims; this represents concession of about 50% of the 
deficiency before the Tax Court, although since the settlement covered years in addition to those then 
pending before the court, the extent of IRS concession appears to have been larger. Overall, while 
results vary from case to case, the IRS typically recovers at trial only a small proportion of transfer 
pricing deficiencies that it has asserted. The lament by Judge Gerber in one case gives a good idea of 
the atmosphere to be found in this field of law, despite attempts to project an image of statistical 
science:  “Once again, we are left stranded in a ‘sea of expertise’ and must navigate our own way 
through a complex record to decide what constitutes an appropriate arm's-length consideration.” H 
Group Holding, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1999-334. The supply of very large, disputed transfer 
pricing adjustments does not seem likely to be exhausted soon.  
15. In connection with the potential revenue implications of the proposed transfer pricing 
reform, it is useful to consider the implications for transfer pricing reform proposals of the recently 
increased accounting scrutiny of companies’ uncertain tax positions following the reforms of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and, especially, the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s Interpretation 48 
(FIN 48). The new accounting rules probably reduce companies’ expectations of financial statement 
benefit from taking what might be perceived as “aggressive” tax positions. Therefore, some of the 
revenue gains that might otherwise be expected from the reform of transfer pricing rules (and from 
some other possible tax reforms) might occur even in the absence of the reform. The recent accounting 
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(v) The fact that neither taxpayers nor enforcement authorities typically have 
clear standards for judging compliance means that issues involving very large 
amounts – billions of dollars – of federal revenue are resolved in examination, settled 
in Appeals, resolved in negotiations under tax treaties with foreign governments, 
negotiated through advance pricing agreements, or settled by attorneys out-of-court 
after examination. In most cases, federal privacy laws require that this decision-
making occur outside the public eye. In the authors’ experience, those involved in this 
process have served their roles with both integrity and skill. Nevertheless, the 
resolution of issues involving such large amounts of money, without the benefit of 
clearly discernable decision-making standards and public scrutiny, is not healthy for 
the tax system. 
(vi) A related problem is that the uncertain results under current transfer 
pricing law degrade the quality of tax practice on the parts of both taxpayer and 
government representatives, regardless of the high standards of practice that both 
sides seek to maintain. Both sides are tempted to state, as “starting points” for what is 
expected to be extended negotiation, positions that strain the edges of what most 
would consider reasonable. The resulting atmosphere contributes to a lessening of the 
publicly perceived credibility of both corporations and the government – a 
development that is seriously damaging to what will always remain a largely mixed 
economic system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Why it cannot be Fixed—The Theoretical Deficiency of the Arm's Length Standard 
 
This subpart explains why the current transfer pricing regime's under-
performance is an inherent and inevitable byproduct of the ALS. Put differently, after 
explaining why the current transfer pricing regime is not working, we turn to explain 
why it cannot work.  
To understand why the ALS imposes a structural limitation on the sourcing of 
MNE income, it is important to examine how MNEs operate and why their business 
model has become so prevalent and successful in the last two decades.  
                                                                                                                                            
changes therefore complicate the task of estimate revenue effects from reforms such as that proposed in 
this article.   
The recent financial accounting changes, however, mitigate the problems of current transfer 
pricing rules only to a limited extent. Although the accounting reforms might prevent some transactions 
in which difficult issues may have arisen, or have altered the pricing that companies have chosen to 
adopt in some circumstances, the reforms generally do not eliminate the uncertainty of current transfer 
pricing rules but shift some of the burden of dealing with it to financial auditors. Moreover, much of 
the portability of income to low- or zero-tax jurisdictions under the current rules does not depend on 
positions that most would view as “aggressive,” but instead involve straightforward application of 
today’s transfer pricing principles. Further, even if some arguably aggressive transactions or reporting 
positions are eliminated, current transfer pricing rules will continue to impose administrative burdens 
and uncertainties even with respect to entirely routine transactions with no hint of tax avoidance intent. 
Thus, while the new accounting rules pose many benefits, including imposing some restraints on 
transactions arguably involving “aggressive” transfer pricing planning, they leave substantial need for 
reform of the transfer pricing tax rules themselves. 
9
Avi-Yonah and Benshalom:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2010
   
MNEs flourish in those industries where the ability to integrate functions in 
different jurisdictions enables them to reduce certain costs through synergy that takes 
advantage of economics of scope and scale. These costs include research and 
development costs, transaction costs, information-obtaining costs, managerial costs, 
and finance costs.15F16 The ability to efficiently internalize these costs is the essence of 
the MNE structure—and an important source of profitability. All MNE entities which 
are somehow involved with the activity that produces the benefits participate in some 
ways in this cost reduction process. It is the MNE's multi-jurisdictional nature that 
enables the reduction of these costs—rather than its activity in any specific 
jurisdiction. Hence the ALS cannot break down the cost of what unrelated parties 
would have done—because the MNE setting is designed precisely to save the costs of 
doing business through unrelated transactions. 
As the above subpart describes, this theoretical deficiency translates to a real 
enforcement deficit. Tax authorities require MNEs to report their income in a way that 
breaks down the cost saving associated with being a MNE on an ALS basis. This 
requirement cannot be met, verified, or consistently enforced. 16F17 This inherent 
vagueness motivates MNEs to structure their affairs in a way that reduces their tax 
costs. To the extent that intra-group transactions are relatively inexpensive, MNEs try 
to shift their income to low-tax jurisdictions and their deductions to high-tax 
jurisdictions.  
Tax authorities have responded to this deficiency with burdensome and 
rigorous transfer pricing rules—which, among other things, impose high 
documentation standards that require MNEs to reveal their intra-group pricing 
methods. While these requirements limit MNEs' abilities to shift income, this Pyrrhic 
victory has come only at the tremendous costs associated with compliance, 
administration, and litigation. These requirements cannot change tax authorities’ 
inherent disadvantaged position in transfer pricing controversies that involve 
sophisticated MNE taxpayers. MNEs enjoy superior information about their own 
activities and can devote more resources to tax planning. Furthermore, in a world 
characterized by an accelerating growth in international commerce and MNEs, it is 
highly questionable whether tax authorities can effectively scrutinize the volume of 
affiliated contractual transactions. 
This gave rise to a dynamic in which tax authorities add layers of complexity 
to ALS transfer pricing enforcement to prevent avoidance. Perhaps paradoxically, tax 
authorities have found themselves dependent on ALS rules, but at the same time 
unable to consistently and effectively apply them. However, as the layers of transfer 
                                                 
16 For example, while it may be very costly to develop informational assets (such as the design of a 
production line), once they are developed, this information could be costlessly distributed and utilized 
in various locations. Hence, a high-tech company like Motorola can develop a production line in 
Britain, which would later be used by a subsidiary in Indonesia. The ability to transfer this knowledge 
in a cheap and reliable way, allows Motorola to pursue the comparative advantages of both the British 
and Indonesian labor markets. This source of  Motorola's profit is a result of its multi-jurisdictional 
nature and cannot be exclusively attributed to Britain, Indonesia, or any other jurisdiction. Another 
example involves a company like Coca-Cola, who needs to invest many resources in building its brand 
name. This requires investing in high profile commercials (e.g., those involving famous movie stars) 
and promotion activities (e.g., sponsoring the Olympic games). The benefit of these activities obviously 
involves an economy of scale since while their fixed costs of production are huge, the same 
commercial can be used in many jurisdictions, and the benefits of sponsoring an international sporting 
event such as the Olympics is not limited to one jurisdiction. 
17  Testimony of Hon. Stephen E. Shay, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy (International), US 
Department of the Treasury, US House Ways and Means Committee, July 22, 2010. 
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pricing regulations continue to accumulate, tax authorities’ commitment to the ALS 
seems as entrenched as ever.  
 
 
II. DISTINGUISHING THE FORMULARY ALTERNATIVE FROM A UNITARY REGIME 
 
Over the years, tax specialists have referred to the unitary system as the major 
alternative to the ALS-based transfer pricing regime. Unitary systems are typically 
used as a way to allocate the corporate tax base between states in federations (e.g., 
Canada and the United States). 
Under a unitary regime, MNEs file a consolidated report with respect to their 
entire earnings—effectively disregarding intra-group transactions. The consolidated 
net (positive or negative) income figure is then allocated among the various 
jurisdictions in which MNEs operate via an apportionment formula. The formula is 
typically comprised of easy-to-observe factors that indicate the economic activity in 
the jurisdiction (e.g., sales, payroll expenses, and assets). The formula allocates the 
income to each jurisdiction according to the relative weight of its indicators.  
This allocation formula represents a policy choice to allocate income by 
approximation—rather than an attempt to precisely determine how MNE income is 
generated. Since there is no one metric that explains the opaque process through 
which MNEs generate profits, the choice of formula factors, their measurement, and 
the relative weight—are not precise indicators of MNE economic activity. Instead, 
they operate as a crude averaging mechanism that allocates MNE income while 
disregarding the distinctive circumstances of MNE investments in different 
jurisdictions. 
Although the unitary system requires an allocation formula, the two terms are 
not equivalent and should be analytically distinguished. Formulary allocation refers 
solely to allocating income through an allocation formula—instead of trying to 
determine the market price of the relevant affiliated transactions that produced the 
income. The unitary concept also tries to consolidate all MNE income sources, which 
is advantageous for corporations because it allows them to consolidate their losses 
from different jurisdictions.  
Unlike the unitary regime, formulary sourcing could be applied to some 
sources of MNE income. It therefore requires distinguishing these sources of income 
from other sources, but does not depend on the ability to consolidate the income of the 
entire MNE group. Put differently, even though a consolidated unitary setting requires 
an allocation formula—allocation formulas could be used also in other settings. The 
formulary tool does not require an ambitious (unitary) MNE income consolidation 
process and does not offer corporations the benefits of comprehensive loss 
consolidation. Instead, formulary allocation could be applied toward specific sources 
of MNE income. 
 
 
III. INTEGRATING FORMULARY SOLUTIONS TO IMPROVE CURRENT TAX 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
This paper argues that formulary, rather than unitary, arrangements can be 
utilized to advance the objectives of the international tax regime. This middle path 
approach has been overlooked, even though it adopting it would not require a 
reformulation of the international tax regime. In previous papers, we have explained 
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how specific formulary and unitary solutions should be implemented. Instead of 
advocating for a specific solution, this paper outlines general considerations for why 
policymakers should consider integrating formulary arrangements into current tax 
practices. It explains why, despite its many difficulties, this integration is realistic and 
would be superior to the current ALS-base transfer pricing regime. 
Critics of the unitary alternative assume that imposing it in a worldwide 
setting would be unrealistic due to insufficient global economic and political 
integration.  However, even if we assume that the unitary alternative is indeed 
utopian, this does not mean that formulary allocation should not be used. While the 
unitary option may indeed be too difficult to implement, it may still be wise to 
examine whether formulary arrangements could better allocate certain sources of 
MNE income—especially in those areas where ALS transfer-pricing rules seem to be 
inadequate. 
This analysis emphasizes two main themes: First, ALS and formulary methods 
are not mutually exclusive. Instead, each of these two methods has its own set of 
strengths and weaknesses—which could be combined and reconciled into an 
integrated regime. This system we suggest would continue to employ ALS allocation 
to transactions where there is an easily observable and consistent market price/rate-of-
return to a certain commodity/commercial-activity. At the same time, this system 
would use formulary arrangements for those hard-to-allocate MNE sources of income.  
A binary distinction between the formulary alternatives is unjustified and 
counterproductive as it helps perpetuate the status quo, which benefits MNEs, tax 
planners, and low-tax haven jurisdictions.  
Second, although not free of problems, a hybrid formulary-ALS regime does 
not have to be perfect. Perfect solutions are hard to come by, which makes 
contemplating and waiting for them an extremely unattractive policy trajectory. 
Instead, the costs of any future regime should be measured against those of the current 
regime. Wise policymaking should aim to realistically reduce rather than completely 
eliminate the problems and social costs associated with current MNE allocation 
arrangements. 
This Part identifies six arguments that are prevalent in the international tax 
policy discourse with respect to formulary apportionment of MNEs’ income. Each of 
these arguments stresses why policymakers should not use formulary arrangements to 
allocate MNE income. This paper labels these arguments "myths" and explains that, 
even taken together, the costs suggested by these arguments do not outweigh the 
potential benefits of a hybrid formulary-ALS MNE allocation regime. We conclude 
that it would be beneficial for tax authorities and the OECD to examine how to 
(cautiously and gradually) shift to such a hybrid regime. 
 
 
 Myth #1: The Formulary Apportionment cannot Replace the Arm's Length Standard 
because it is Arbitrary 
 
UThe Myth:  
  
Any formulary allocation is, at the end of the day, merely a crude 
approximation of where MNE economic activity is taking place. The underlying 
assumption behind the formulary regime is that the location of formulary factors—
such as sales, payroll and assets—mimics the way MNEs generate profits. Hence it 
assumes that MNEs yield the same average rate of return on their assets, employees, 
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and sale activities. This assumption is evidently wrong, and the arbitrariness of 
relying upon it prohibits tax authorities from shifting from an ALS to a formulary 
regime because source taxes should be levied in the jurisdictions where they are 
actually generated.  
 
UThe Prospect: 
 
Formulary allocation is indeed merely an approximation which cannot 
penetrate the MNE profit-generating process. However, from a theoretical 
perspective, formulary alternatives are as arbitrary as the ALS. From a revenue-
generating perspective, formulary arrangements are probably less arbitrary—because 
they are less susceptible to manipulation by intra-MNE contractual arrangements.  
Theoretically, the ALS relies on fiction because it dictates a sourcing method 
that is insensitive to any specific intra-group pricing method MNEs actually have. The 
ALS uses market comparables to source income according to the most prevalent 
market transactions and not according to how the MNE really operates. For example, 
assume three different oil companies whose costs of extracting refining and shipping 
oil products differ. The companies are each able to derive excessive profits: one by 
attaining lucrative licenses from various governments, another by developing special 
deep-ocean-drilling technologies, and the third by successfully foreseeing trends in oil 
and shipping prices. Even though their sources of profit differ, under a transfer-
pricing regime the intra-group transactions of the three MNEs would be priced 
similarly because market-price benchmarks are available for all oil products. Hence, 
where it is easy to observe the price of various products, the ALS provides a 
reasonable sourcing method because it is fixed and therefore efficient—and not 
because it is correct. As in the case of any presumptive tax, the fixed nature of the 
ALS provides an incentive to all three oil companies to conduct their operation in the 
most efficient manner because they cannot avoid the tax.  
While the theoretical arbitrariness of the ALS is not by itself a problem, it is 
important to stress that two conditions have to be fulfilled for it to operate as a good 
proxy. First, tax authorities should have a comprehensive taxonomy and pricing 
schedule of the relevant market transactions. Second, geographical and legal partitions 
within the MNE should reflect some type of economic and operational distinction. 
Today, these two conditions are far from being fulfilled because MNEs derive much 
of their profits from functional integration, which allows them to increase the benefits 
precisely in those fields where there are no good markets. This means that a great deal 
of MNE profitability is derived from unique intra-MNE transactions (e.g., the use of 
intangibles, the rendering of managerial services). With respect to these transactions, 
MNEs have to come up with significant amount of paperwork to justify their pricing 
even though many of these transactions could not have taken place between unrelated 
parties. Therefore, from a tax administration perspective, the ALS is a futile and 
inadequate proxy to allocate the income of these transactions. 
Obviously, in those cases where the tax savings are substantial, and the costs 
of intra-group transactions are (relatively) cheap, MNEs have the incentive to use 
ALS arbitrariness to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions. Hence, from a revenue 
raising perspective, it is very arbitrary to allow MNEs to determine their tax allocation 
through intra-group contracts. An allocation formula that is based on relatively 
immobile, difficult-to-manipulate, and easy-to-observe indicators of economic 
activity would provide a much less arbitrary stream of revenues.  
13
Avi-Yonah and Benshalom:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2010
   
This inaptness of the ALS is also (de facto) recognized by tax authorities, who 
increasingly rely on profit-split methods to price affiliated transactions with no good 
market comparables. Instead of trying to hypothesize how unrelated parties would 
price the transaction, profit split methods aggregate the income generated from them 
and divide it according to each subsidiary's contribution. This vague notion of 
contribution is essentially a quasi-formulary approach. Rather than trying to 
determine price elasticities of various functions that each subsidiary preformed, it 
determines the allocation of income by the relative volume of activity taken in each 
jurisdiction. Hence, although profit-split methods are considered part of the ALS-
based transfer pricing rules, tax authorities’ increasing reliance on them signals that 
they recognize the limitedness of ALS-based rules. 
 
Myth #2: Formulary Apportionment would Require a Comprehensive International 
Corporate Tax Base 
 
UThe Myth: 
 
Of all the various fields of economic regulation, direct taxation of businesses 
is probably the field in which nations are least able to coordinate and harmonize their 
rules. While all tax regimes are devastatingly complex, each country seems to attach a 
lot of value to its own form of complexity. In this state of affairs, trying to implement 
any formulary regime would be a Sisyphean task. Every formulary arrangement 
requires some measurement of the income that would be allocated by the formula. 
Given the low record of international tax harmonization, there is little reason to 
believe that corporate income would be measured similarly by different countries.  
 
UThe Prospect: 
 
This paper's main claim is that formulary arrangement should not allocate all 
MNE income but only those sources of income where the ALS is inadequate. The 
proposed regime would therefore be comprised of both ALS and formulary 
sourcing—with the latter applied only to a subset of MNE income. This subset would 
be comprised of those sources of MNE income that could not be sourced according to 
the ALS.  
We agree that any attempt to form a comprehensive corporate tax base in the 
near future suffers from high failure probabilities. 17F18 We further agree that it would be 
unfeasible to establish any international sourcing unitary regime that requires the 
measurement of the MNE’s entire income. However, unlike unitary arrangements, 
formulary arrangements offer a different (much more limited) alternative. Formulary 
sourcing regimes could be applied only to a subset of MNE income and not to a 
consolidated income figure of the entire group of MNE subsidiaries.  
This paper refers to the sources of income that should be taxed by formulary 
arrangements as the residual. This residual should be comprised of those income-
                                                 
18  Most indicative is the ongoing (and one could say everlasting) EU attempt to form such a tax base as 
part of the CCCTB initiative. Member States, which have an impressive record of harmonizing their 
trade and monetary policies, find it difficult to agree upon the features of such a tax base. This 
difficulty is striking because the CCCTB is planned to be optional, so that European Member States 
and MNEs can subscribe to it but would not have to. See on this issue Ilan Benshalom, A 
Comprehensive Solution for a Targeted Problem: A Critique of the Eu's Home State Taxation and 
Ccctb Initiatives, 48 Eur. Tax’n 630 (2009) 
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generating activities that could not be easily sourced by the ALS because there is no 
adequate benchmark to which they could be compared. This residual category would 
be primarily comprised of income derived from mobile intangible and financial assets. 
The key problem is that the intra-group ownership of these assets is tax elastic 
because MNEs' direct costs of moving them to different subsidiaries are low. 
Moreover, the indirect costs of holding these assets in low-tax jurisdictions may also 
be low because the economic benefit of owning them is not limited to the subsidiary 
that owns them. For example, financial assets stored in a foreign subsidiary could be 
re-invested by it either in intra-group enterprises or in other interest-bearing financial 
assets. Furthermore, a parent company can borrow against the financial assets of its 
subsidiary and thus lower its interest rate. For a low-tax jurisdiction to be attractive, it 
should also have stable business-friendly political and economic-regulatory 
environments. However, there are many low-tax jurisdictions that have these features, 
and MNEs achieve low costs and low risks by owning assets through subsidiaries 
located in them.  
Intangible assets present one example of income-generating activity that 
cannot be easily sourced by the ALS. They are characterized by high fixed and low 
marginal costs of production and could be owned anywhere because they have no 
fiscal presence. As part of the shift of developed countries to a post-industrial 
economy, intangible assets comprise an ever-growing share of MNEs' assets and are 
becoming more complex, diversified, and unique.  Hence, it could be difficult to price 
these assets and the services rendered to create them. For example, if a MNE 
subsidiary located in a low-tax jurisdiction owns an intangible asset, all the entities in 
the MNE group could use it (in return for royalties). Intangibles can be anything—
rights for exclusivity, patents, trade names—and they could be transferred to a 
corporate entity in a low-tax jurisdiction before they are operational so that it bears 
the risk of their failure. A MNE can capitalize a low-tax subsidiary and make sure that 
it contracts with other subsidiaries to undertake most of the process of developing the 
intangible. While those subsidiaries would be compensated for their services—under 
an ALS transfer pricing regime, the low-tax subsidiary would be compensated for the 
risk it undertakes. Since much of intangibles' value is not known at the time of their 
development, this compensation for risk may be substantial. In a non-ALS, more-
common-sense world, one might wonder what component of the risk would be 
actually borne by the subsidiary in the low-tax jurisdiction. The ownership of the 
intangible, its finance, and the risk associated with it are all conducted by the same 
MNE—which makes the process of assigning ownership to one subsidiary rather 
obscure. Assigning the ownership of the intangible to the low-tax subsidiary looks 
more like a shift of assets from one pocket to another, and there seems to be no real 
meaning to the intra-group contractual allocation of risk. What unrelated parties 
would have done seems irrelevant—because unrelated parties would have to really 
bear the risk themselves if the development of the intangible fails. 
Furthermore, to best utilize intangible assets MNEs adopt a horizontally 
integrated business model in which intangibles are simultaneously created and utilized 
by different MNE entities. This functional integration often means that the risks and 
interests borne by the different MNE collides so that breaking up their value between 
MNE subsidiaries in accordance with the ALS is simply meaningless.  
In the case of financial transactions, the problem of pricing is not as acute as in 
the case of intangibles—pricing the "proper" related-party interest rate is a feasible 
task for most tax authorities. However, tax authorities do not have the analytical or 
enforcement tools to determine whether a debt form of the intra-group investment 
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transaction is itself proper. This inability introduces a huge tax enforcement problem 
given the many alternative ways that MNEs can mobilize and repackage their 
commonly controlled pool of fungible capital assets and liabilities. Because money is 
a fungible commodity, the internal capital structure of a MNE is tax elastic, which 
means that taxpayers can use economically equivalent but legally different 
transactions to finance their activities. By categorizing the intra-group financial 
transaction in a tax-efficient way, MNEs can skew the risks associated with related-
party financing to low-tax jurisdictions. Under the ALS, these risks would have to be 
compensated for. Hence, even though it could widely be assumed that affiliated 
lending and borrowing involves much less credit risk than unrelated transactions, the 
ALS requires tax authorities to price their interest rate as if made between unrelated 
parties.  
MNEs enjoy the ability to assign the ownership and leasing rights over their 
mobile assets to the various entities in the different jurisdictions in which they 
operate. The inaptness of the ALS basis means therefore that MNEs are able to use 
their contractual freedom to shift income and thereby avoid taxes on income arising 
from those mobile assets. Furthermore, it means that MNEs are able to use the 
internal dealing of financial and intangible resources to strip the income from tangible 
activities that are conducted in entities located in high-tax jurisdictions. 18F19 
Instead of this convoluted system, this paper suggests a hybrid regime—where 
the residual income is taxed on a formulary basis while other (perhaps the majority) of 
MNE activities are taxed by the ALS. MNEs will find it considerably more difficult to 
shift income in those cases where there is a clear, easily observable, and consistently 
priced market benchmark. Hence, tax authorities should continue to apply ALS-based 
rules—because they offer a fixed (and therefore efficient), easily monitored and 
enforced proxy to the location where profits are generated. While comparable price 
mechanisms could still be used, we have a strong preference for (fixed and inflexible) 
comparative profit methods (CPMs)—which assume a certain rate of return for a 
given activity. The main benefit of such CPMs is that they limit MNEs' ability to shift 
income via intra-group contractual risk allocations. 19F20 The residual income—where 
there is no adequate market comparable—should be taxed by formulary arrangements.  
There is no one correct formula—and, indeed, different portions of the 
residual may be sourced by different formulary arrangements. Each formulary 
arrangement should try to provide a crude yet sensible proxy to the location of the 
income-generating activities associated with the relevant source of income it seeks to 
allocate.  For example, a plausible formulary arrangement in the case of intangibles 
would try to allocate the income attributed to intangibles to those locations where they 
have been generated and/or where they are utilized.20F21 A formulary arrangement of the 
                                                 
19 For example, since MNEs are able to manage their own internal financial structures, they aim to do 
so in the way that allows them the most favorable (after tax) result. This prescribes that they would take 
advantage of interest payments' deductibility and the low source-withholding taxes on interest, to 
finance their activities in high-tax jurisdictions through related-party debt. See detailed explanation in 
Ilan Benshalom, The Quest to Tax Interest Income: Stages in the Development of International 
Taxation, 27 Va. Tax Rev. 631 (2008) 
20  For example, distribution and manufacturing services would be allocated a certain percentage of the 
overall sales. See Ilan Benshalom, Sourcing The "Unsourceable": The Cost Sharing Regulations and 
the Sourcing of Affiliated-Intangible Related Transactions, 26 Va. Tax Rev. 631 (2007) 
21 See Id. at . This article provides a distinction between production based (R&D) intangibles that 
should be allocated to the places where they have been generated, and passive intangibles—where there 
is no economic significance to the place where they have been created but only to where they are 
utilized. The article also provides some sourcing solutions for complex intangibles 
16
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 28 [2010]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/art28
   
income derived from financial assets would recognize that financial assets and 
obligations are owned by the MNE group as a whole. This prescribes that financial 
income should be allocated among jurisdictions based on the relative amount of MNE 
assets and activities located in them. 21F22 This paper focuses on advancing the notion 
that once MNE residual income would not be allocated on an ALS basis, many of the 
problems of the current transfer pricing regime would be significantly reduced. This 
would allow the ALS to become the effective enforcement tool it was originally 
intended to be—a credible, efficient, and easily administered benchmark for 
allocating MNE income. 
The hybrid regime would not be free of problems as it would still involve 
distinguishing the residual income from the income generated through other activities 
and measuring it. However, tax authorities face the same difficulties under the current 
regime. Hence, although many aspects of MNE sourcing are bound to be determined 
by fact-specific valuation inquiries, a hybrid regime could deal more adequately with 
the problem of shifting. At the very minimum, MNE sourcing arrangements should 
seek to detach issues concerned with the economic ownership of mobile assets from 
questions of valuating how much income the MNEs generate from them. As they do 
now, tax authorities and MNEs would have to resolve the questions of whether a 
certain source of income is part of the residual and to value the net income derived 
from a certain asset or activity. However, once these questions are resolved, a hybrid 
regime would relieve tax authorities (and MNEs) from the burden of hypothesizing 
what unrelated parties would do to allocate the benefits of complicated and MNE-
unique transactions.  
 
 
Myth #3: Formulary Apportionment is Impossible because it would be Insensitive and 
therefore Disruptive) to actual Business Practices 
 
UThe Myth: 
 
The common denominator of all formulary arrangements is the contention that 
intra-group related transactions should be disregarded. This notion is inconsistent with 
how MNE subsidiaries do business with each other. In a business reality where legal 
ownership and classification have important economic consequences—arguing that 
intra-MNE transactions should be disregarded will result in inaccurate measurement 
of MNE income. For example, debt investment is different from equity investment (in 
terms of insolvency priority), the legal ownership of intellectual property would 
determine the regulatory regime it is subject to, and certain subsidiaries may have 
regulatory restrictions on the risks that they can undertake. Disregarding all these 
attributes would be intellectually wrong but would also disrupt the manner in which 
MNEs do business. Furthermore, consider a MNE engaged in a massive (and overall 
profitable) international R&D project that involves subsidiaries in many jurisdictions. 
                                                 
22 Therefore, a possible formulary arrangement of financial assets and risks would disregard the tax 
consequences of affiliated MNE transactions altogether. This prescribes that the net taxable financial 
income of MNEs should be determined through financial transaction with unrelated parties. This net 
taxable financial income figure would be allocated via a formula that would take into account tangible 
asset payroll and the total amount of sales in different jurisdictions. See Ilan Benshalom, The Quest to 
Tax Financial Income in a Global Economy: Emerging to an Allocation Phase – Taxing Global 
Financial Institutions, 28 Va. Tax Rev. 165 (2008); Ilan Benshalom, Taxing the Financial Income of 
Multinational Enterprises by Employing a Formulary Arm’s Length Allocation Mechanism, 28 Va. Tax 
Rev. 631 (2009). 
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One of these subsidiaries, which is in charge of one potential application of the 
intangible, has an inadequate business model and labor force. As a result, this 
subsidiary inflicts massive costs on the entire project. Under a formulary arrangement, 
the actual performance of the subsidiary would be disregarded and it would receive a 
(positive) share of the net income generated by the intangible.  This result is 
counterintuitive and incorrect because it would allocate tax revenues to a tax 
jurisdiction which did not have any real contribution to the MNE income generating 
process. 
 
UThe Prospect:  
 
The argument that formulary arrangements are insensitive to business 
practices should be analytically distinguished from the argument that these 
arrangements would disrupt such practices. There are three different arguments for 
why the alleged insensitivity of formulary arrangements would not result in major 
disruptions to current business practices. First, formulary apportionment only 
disregards intra-MNE transactions for tax purposes. This disregard would not spill 
over to other legal regimes, so many of the non-tax motivated business practices will 
continue to take place. Second, business practices are not engraved in stone but are 
responsive to the tax-regulatory environments in which they operate. Some 
contemporary business practices have been negatively impacted by the ALS over the 
years—so a shift to a hybrid regime may actually reduce the disruption of MNEs’ 
efficient allocation of resources. Finally, formulary arrangements are averaging 
mechanisms that rely upon fixed indicators that cannot be nuanced to every aspect of 
MNEs' operation.  However, fixed and crude sourcing arrangements are likely to be 
more efficient and (may be) more equitable if their overall result proxies the 
economic reality of where MNEs operate. Furthermore, formulary arrangements can 
be subject to certain (limited) exceptions, which would provide the hybrid regime 
with flexibility.  
This subpart elaborates upon the above arguments in the order presented. First, 
the tax treatment of intra-MNE related transactions does not undermine MNEs 
freedom of contract or deny them the flexibility to arrange their intra-group 
contractual affairs as they see fit. While MNEs enjoy the right to arrange their 
financial and assets-ownership structures, they do not have a right to freely determine 
their tax liability through those transactions. More specifically, while MNEs should 
have the right to move their financial and intangible assets to subsidiaries located in 
offshore financial tax havens like Bermuda, they have no enshrined right that this 
transfer would be taxed on an ALS basis. Hence, if MNEs have certain legitimate 
business advantages for moving assets to low-tax jurisdictions, the formulary tax 
arrangement disregards the tax consequences of the transfer but does not deny the 
MNEs any of the non-tax advantages. It does aim to limit the tax advantages 
associated with such asset shifting, which essentially do not reflect any real tangible 
business activity or risk taking by the MNE.  
Second, ALS indeed tries to mimic certain business practices, but the situation 
is more dynamic because current business practices are also, partly, shaped by ALS 
sourcing arrangements. The ALS was adopted between the two World Wars because 
it was consistent with the business reality of that era. In the brick and mortar industrial 
economy of the first half of the twentieth century, there was often a functional 
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distinction between subsidiaries which aligned with corporate and national borders. 22F23  
Today, MNEs integrate many of their cross-border functions. For example, many 
high-tech MNEs such as Microsoft have the same intangible assets being developed in 
multiple R&D centers around the world. These centers share sensitive information 
and communicate daily through thousands of e-mails, telephone calls, and video 
conferences. This integrated and interdependent production model would not be 
possible with unrelated parties, so that arguing that the revenues generated from it 
should be allocated on an ALS-basis seems obsolete. Hence, to the extent that ALS 
aligns with cross-border, functionally integrated business practices, it is because the 
latter have adjusted so that MNEs can "translate" their practice to fit ALS tax-
accounting conventions.  
This point could be taken a bit further—suggesting that MNEs have some 
interest in shifting to a hybrid regime. While they obviously wish to maintain their 
income-shifting privileges under the existing regime, the current transfer-pricing 
system is costly for them as well. Having to come up with a case-by-case pricing 
methodology supported by documentation and the need to prepare for lengthy tax 
audits and tax-controversy proceedings consumes a considerable amount of financial 
and managerial time-resources. Additionally, there may be some non-tax cost to 
income shifting. This means that income-shifting of mobile assets may result in 
inefficient allocation of resources—despite the fact that it reduces the overall (tax and 
non-tax) costs of the MNE. Hence, when contemplating the political price necessary 
to get MNEs on board, policymakers should bear in mind that a hybrid regime would 
benefit them in certain respects as well. 
Third, formulary arrangements are indeed a one-size-fits-all alternative to the 
ALS transfer pricing rule. 23F24 The main strength of the formulary mechanism is that it 
relies on (relatively) simple income-averaging and allocation rules. Simplicity, 
however, is not a free good, and in the world of tax administration simplicity typically 
comes as a tradeoff to flexibility and accuracy. Formulary arrangements should 
therefore be designed so that they allocate income in a way that (roughly) reflects the 
level of MNE economic activity in a specific jurisdiction. They cannot (and should 
not) be designed to accommodate any specific MNE business model or situation. The 
formulary arrangement should be structured to cover the vast majority of cases. This 
would greatly reduce compliance and administrative costs, and would result in a more 
transparent and equally applied MNE tax allocation regime. 24F25 Since tax authorities 
already rely on these ad hoc formulary arrangements,25F26 they have much to gain and 
little to lose by making this explicit and shifting to more structured formulary 
arrangements. 
                                                 
23 Hence, when the income tax was first imposed, it made a lot of sense to employ the ALS—which 
mimicked how cross border transactions really occurred. However, the economy has radically changed 
over the last eighty years as communication and transportation technologies have developed and as 
political and regulatory constraints have been gradually removed. This, inevitably, has also changed 
how MNEs operate. Ilan Benshalom, The Quest to Tax Interest Income: Stages in the Development of 
International Taxation, 27 Va. Tax Rev. 631 (2008) 
24  There may be different formulary arrangements for different type of activities or income sources 
(see supra note 21-22 for references to such formulary arrangements). The one-size-fits-all means that 
these formulary arrangement are fixed so that taxpayers have no ability to elect which one they would 
be subject to. 
25 Avi-Yonah, Clausing and Durst, supra. 
26 As mentioned, tax authorities have, in many cases, already abandoned traditional ALS in favor of 
profit-split income allocation methods. Even though these methods use quasi-formulary principles, they 
still have to be implemented on a case-by-case basis. This means that they still extract considerable 
compliance and audit resources. Furthermore, MNEs still control when and how to use those methods. 
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Admittedly, there may be cases where the formulary arrangement reaches 
counterintuitive results or is just too costly to implement. However, there are ways to 
deal with these cases without losing the overall advantages associated with the hybrid 
regime. First, the formulary component in the hybrid regime should be designed as a 
default rule. Like the Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) process today, 26F27 MNEs with 
unique business models and/or unique circumstances, would be able to enter into 
special tax-sourcing agreements with tax authorities. Today the baseline for those 
negotiations is the ALS transfer-pricing regime, in which MNEs have an advantage 
over tax authorities when there are no clear market benchmarks. 27F28 In contrast, under a 
hybrid formulary-ALS regime, tax authorities would have a much better opening 
bargaining position. Whenever there is no clear market benchmark, MNEs would 
have to allocate the taxes by a formula that is based on easy-to-observe and difficult-
to-manipulate factors. Second, while most large MNEs probably have a significant 
residual component, small-to-medium MNEs' residual income may be relatively 
small. Other (perhaps even relatively large) MNEs may have a small residual income 
component. Since those MNEs would still be required to use the ALS standard, 
imposing a formulary arrangement on them would increase their compliance costs 
significantly without providing any significant revenue advantages to tax authorities. 
Therefore, a certain de minimis rule should be applied so that formulary arrangements 
would not be imposed when the costs of introducing it seem very high in comparison 
to its benefits.   
 
 
Myth #4: It would be Easy to Tax-Plan Against Formulary Arrangements 28F*  
  
UThe Myth: 
Formulary arrangements assume that there are easy-to-observe and hard-to-
manipulate indicators of economic activity. However, once the formulary factors are 
spelled out, MNEs would change their behavior so that as much as possible of their 
taxable income would be allocated to low-tax jurisdictions. MNEs can manipulate the 
form of their transactions—e.g., if payroll is a factor, then MNEs would engage in 
direct hiring in low-tax jurisdictions and outsource functions in high-tax jurisdictions. 
If the location of sales is taken into account by the formula, then MNEs would finalize 
their sales in tax havens.  
 
UThe Prospect: 
The identification of formulary factors obviously provides taxpayers with the 
incentive to manipulate the indicators to minimize their tax liabilities. The question is 
not whether MNEs would have these incentives under a hybrid allocation regime, but 
the extent to which they are likely to respond to these incentives. This subpart outlines 
why MNEs’ incentives to manipulate formulary factors would not be detrimental to 
the functioning of the hybrid regime. 
The question of the tax elasticity of MNEs' behavior with respect to formulary 
factors is empirical and therefore difficult to answer given our limited experience with 
                                                 
27 Diane M. Ring, On the Frontier of Procedural Innovation: Advanced Pricing Agreements and the 
Struggle to Allocate Income for Cross-Border Taxation, 21 Mich. J.of Int. Law 143 (2000) 
28 Namely their ability to drag tax authorities into long fact intensive audit controversies where they the 
MNEs have superior information. 
* This myth relates only to the problem of tax induced manipulation and not to with the shifting of real 
economic activity offshore—an issue dealt with in Myth #6. 
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formulary and unitary arrangements in the international arena. 29 F29  Our first observation 
is that MNEs are not likely to engage in manipulation if it is costly and the tax 
rewards to it are low. One attribute that minimizes the rewards for manipulation under 
a hybrid regime is that the formulary arrangement would apply only to the residual 
income. This means that, unlike the unitary regime, the rewards for manipulating the 
allocation formula in a hybrid regime would be considerably lower—because only a 
subset of the MNE income could be diverted. A second attribute relates to the number 
of factors. If the formula has many factors, MNEs would find it difficult to gain big 
tax advantages by manipulating any one of them. A third attribute relates to the non-
tax costs which manipulating a certain factor would entail. If there are real non-tax 
costs associated with moving the factor, the likelihood that MNEs would engage in 
aggressive manipulation is low.  
The key is therefore to come up with enough difficult-to-manipulate and easy-
to-observe factors that would provide an indication to the level of MNE economic 
activity in a specific jurisdiction. For example, the following factors seem to satisfy 
this requirement: retail sales and services (by the country of the purchaser), overall 
sales in a given jurisdiction (including sales made by agents), movable assets, real 
estate assets, value of leases, payroll of direct employees, payroll of outside 
contractors that work more than twenty hours per week in the MNE premises, etc. 30F30  
There is no magic set of factors—and their choice should be a complicated 
process of trial and error. For example, if tax authorities find that MNEs can easily 
manipulate the location of business-to-business sales, then they should avoid using 
this factor and replace it with a more difficult-to-manipulate factor such as retail 
sales. 31F31 Additionally, assets should be attributed to the location where they are 
employed and not where they are used because MNEs can easily shift the legal 
ownership of assets. The location of inventories and intangible assets is mobile and 
tax sensitive in many cases so that their value of these assets should be significantly 
discounted (inventories), or omitted altogether for formulary purposes (intangibles). 32F32  
The payroll factor reflects the human capital MNEs employ in a given jurisdiction, 
which is (relatively) easy to observe and difficult to shift (because employees are 
difficult to move).33F33  
                                                 
29 Most unitary arrangements are applied in federative nations to allocate the state corporate tax base. It 
is difficult to conclude from the intra-nation example because the effective corporate tax rate on the 
state level tends to be low. In the United States, for example, rates are typically below 10% and state 
tax liabilities are deductable from the federal tax liability of corporations. Consequently, in federative 
nations the unitary system does not seem to have any prohibitive costs associated with corporate 
manipulation of the formulary factors. Hence, this type of limited response may not be indicative of 
what may happen if a unitary regime was to be implemented in the international arena where some 
countries have significantly higher effective tax rates than those imposed by states. 
30 Jack Mintz & Joann M. Weiner, Ome Open Negotiation Issues Involving a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base in the European Union, 62 Tax L. Rev. 81 (2008) 
31 It is relatively easy to observe the location of most retail transactions because the vast majority of 
these transactions take place where individuals live. It is, however, important to remember that not all 
retail transactions may be easy to observe. The sale of software products, for example, could be 
conducted via the web anywhere. Hence it may be reasonable to say that the sale factor should not be 
part of the default rule formula but only something that MNEs would be able to take into account by 
undertaking an APA negotiation process.   
32 Alternatively, inventories and intangibles may not be in the default rule formula but only something 
that MNEs would be able to take into account by undertaking an APA negotiation process. 
33 The payroll factor should be defined very broadly to guarantee that the relative costs of employment 
in each jurisdiction are adequately reflected in the formula. Additionally, the cost of outsourcing 
certain functions that resemble direct employment should also be taken into account, so that MNEs 
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MNEs’ motivation and ability to manipulate formulary factors under a hybrid 
regime are indeed a source of concern. However, a carefully delineated formulary 
arrangement could reduce these concerns significantly. While the above outlined 
structural features of a hybrid regime are not likely to eliminate MNEs' manipulation, 
they may help constrain it so that such shifting takes place only on the margins. 
The relevant point of reference to which any hybrid regime should be 
compared is the current ALS-based transfer pricing regime. Hence, the hybrid system 
does not have to be planning-proof, but only to perform better. As established, there 
seems to be robust evidence that ALS conventions result in a lot of tax planning and 
avoidance. Additionally, under a hybrid regime, tax authorities would still be able to 
deploy the anti-avoidance strategies they currently use to counter aggressive tax 
planning (e.g., general anti-avoidance rules and anti-avoidance judicial doctrines).   
The hybrid regime would allocate income according to economic indicators 
and would replace a system where tax planning is to a large extent a byproduct of 
intra-MNE paper shifting. This, at least to our minds, makes it very unlikely that a 
hybrid regime would underperform with respect to current international tax 
arrangements.  
 
 
 
Myth #5: Formulary Apportionment would Revoke Current International Tax 
Arrangements and Require Unattainable Tax Coordination 
 
UThe Myth: 
 
While the current ALS-base transfer pricing regime is far from perfect, 
formulary apportionment offers no alternative. Even if academics could come up with 
the "correct" formulary mechanism to allocate MNE income, policymakers would 
have to take into account practical considerations. First, they would have to take into 
account that the ALS is already the rule of the road and is enshrined in tax treaties and 
other documents such as the OECD model tax treaty and commentary. Second, 
formulary arrangements require intensive cooperation to work smoothly because they 
involve a lot of open questions—such as how to define the residual, how to define the 
MNE group itself, and how to measure and weight the different factors.  
Formulary and unitary arrangements offer a good solution for federal nations 
because all states have roughly the same tax base, the same tax accounting 
conventions, and mandatory dispute resolution procedures (in the form of federal 
courts). These features of federative nations prevent states from using formulary 
arrangements to expropriate taxes from other states. However, none of these features 
exist at the international level, which means that a hybrid regime would impose a 
substantial risk of tax expropriation. While most countries may be better off if they all 
implement a certain hybrid formulary arrangement, it seems naïve to think that they 
would be able to reach and sustain an agreement that requires intensive ongoing 
coordination. Absent cooperation, countries will have the incentive to structure 
expansive formulary arrangements that would lead to double taxation and impose a 
heavy burden on cross-border trade and investments. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
would not have the ability to reduce their tax liability by reducing the number of their direct employees 
in a high-tax jurisdiction and inflating it in low-tax ones. 
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UThe Prospect:  
 
 This subpart argues that policymakers can apply a hybrid formulary-ALS 
arrangement without first revoking the current treaty-based international tax regime, 
entering any multinational tax convention, or establishing an international tax 
organization to administer it. While reforming many of the current international tax 
conventions as well as increasing tax coordination among countries may entail many 
advantages, an implementation of a hybrid regime does not require either. This paper 
contends that a hybrid allocation regime would offer a feasible alternative to the 
current transfer-pricing regime even if it is only loosely coordinated and adopted only 
by some countries. To become the new rule of the road, such a regime would only 
require bilateral agreements that reduce potential double taxation from conflicting 
formulary systems. To establish a better MNE allocation regime, tax authorities do 
not have to reach the same income-allocation figures, or to use the same methods. All 
they need is to reconcile their differences by entering bilateral treaties—which is very 
similar to what countries do today.  
The adoption of the hybrid regime does not necessarily require revoking the 
current treaty-based international tax regime. True, most treaties do require the use of 
the ALS to allocate the income of related parties—subsidiaries and branches. 
However, countries have recognized that ALS mechanisms are insufficient and in 
many instances have moved towards mechanisms that are closer to formulary 
allocation.  While tax authorities that apply profit rules adhere to ALS rhetoric, they 
are not confined to market alternatives and are not required to act consistently with 
other tax authorities. Hence, while most countries claim they apply ALS conventions, 
with respect to hard-to-tax MNE income, many of them use different (uncoordinated) 
quasi-formulary methods. This gives the impression that the main objection to 
formulary arrangements is title-based. Despite the contractual language of their tax 
treaties, countries seem to be willing to accept arrangements that deviate from the 
ALS as long as the deviation is not explicitly pronounced, is followed by other 
countries, and is done under the umbrella of OECD model convention and 
commentary. If these conditions would be met, it would also be possible to shift away 
from ALS-rules to a hybrid regime.  
An example for such a shift, which also demonstrates the OECD's role in 
fostering gradual departure from ALS norms, can be seen in its recent proposal to 
revise branch allocation rules. This proposal advocates allocating the income of 
branches of financial institutions by the location of their significant people.34 F34 While 
refraining from publicly denouncing its support for the ALS, this move towards 
allocation seems like a major deviation towards a payroll formulary arrangement. The 
OECD was correct to identify financial institutions as MNEs that require special 
allocation rules 35F35 and has taken long-awaited necessary steps towards facilitating a 
change. Although still in formulation, the OECD's branch allocation proposal 
demonstrates the tremendous institutional power it has in the international tax arena, 
and its ability to lead quiet revolutions in existing tax conventions and treaties through 
the commentary. Like in the case of the profit-split methods, which were introduced 
by the U.S. Treasury and the OECD during the 1990s, 36F36 the branch allocation rules 
demonstrate that tax conventions have changed, are changing, and will change. If the 
                                                 
34  See OECD, Report on the Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings (July 22, 2010). 
35 Ilan Benshalom, The Quest to Tax Financial Income in a Global Economy: Emerging to an 
Allocation Phase – Taxing Global Financial Institutions, 28 Va. Tax Rev. 165 (2008) 
36  Avi-Yonah, Rise and Fall, supra. 
23
Avi-Yonah and Benshalom:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2010
   
problems are well identified and institutional leadership exists, important changes can 
be made. Whether these changes are titled as a shift to a formulary regime is a 
question of diplomacy rather than of tax policy. Hence, we conclude that a shift 
towards a hybrid regime would not have to revoke current tax arrangements. 
While enhanced multinational tax cooperation may be desirable, it is not a 
necessary precondition for a well-functioning hybrid allocation regime. Critics of 
formulary arrangement tend to exaggerate the level of tax cooperation that would be 
necessary to make it effective. Obviously, the hybrid regime would operate more 
smoothly and be more effective if all tax regimes apply the same (or very similar) 
formulary mechanisms. If tax authorities follow the same principle arrangements, they 
are likely to reach similar allocation results, which would make it easier to reconcile 
their differences through bilateral negotiations. However, stating that intensive 
cooperation could help improve the operation of a hybrid regime differs from the 
claim that it is a prerequisite for such a regime to operate better than the one in place.  
Under a hybrid regime the situation would not be very different from what it is 
today. As is currently the case, most (non-haven) countries have a clear objective to 
prevent the income-shifting benefits associated with the ALS-based transfer pricing 
regime. However, they also have a clear objective to prevent a situation where the 
international tax regime imposes significant incidents of double taxation that burdens 
international trade and investment. Adding these factors together, non-haven 
sovereigns have a clear incentive to embark on a two-step strategy. Step one would 
involve imposing an effective (hybrid) MNE allocation regime that would prevent 
income shifting. Step two would involve engaging in some type of bilateral or 
multilateral treaty contractual arrangement to reduce incidents of double taxation 
among them. Hence, the second step would require tax authorities to modify their 
sourcing results according to the sourcing consequences of other countries' formulas. 
This two-step strategy resembles how the international tax regime operates today—
through bilateral treaties with some soft-law guidance from the OECD. 37F37 Soft-law 
mechanisms are not ideal, but they are often sufficient to allow significant changes in 
international arrangements.  
Reading the debate about formulary arrangements, one often gets the 
impression that many commentators think that formulary arrangements require (an 
almost) unanimous international agreement. However, as in the case of any 
international policy, this assumption has serious negative effects—rather than seeking 
unanimity, policymakers should pursue the support of a critical mass of non-haven 
countries. Not all countries would be better off with a hybrid regime, and expecting 
all countries to approve it is like giving veto power to those countries that benefit 
from income-shifting. Put differently, it is extremely unlikely that a shift to the hybrid 
regime (or any other reform in international tax conventions) could achieve Pareto 
optimality. First, achieving Pareto optimality may require expensive buyouts—which 
would reduce the reform's benefits. Second, it is also not clear whether Pareto 
optimality is the right standard that international tax policymakers should adopt. Some 
low-tax jurisdictions benefit from the current ALS-based regime by offering MNE a 
convenient location to perform conduit transactions. It is not clear why the 
governments of developed and developing countries should subsidize this behavior by 
recognizing the tax validity of these transactions. This paper does not argue against 
buyouts or against special treaty provisions that are intended to encourage countries to 
                                                 
37  For a detailed example of a possible mutual recognition bilateral arrangement see: Ilan Benshalom, 
Taxing the Financial Income of Multinational Enterprises by Employing a Formulary Arm’s Length 
Allocation Mechanism, 28 Va. Tax Rev. 631 (2009). 
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adopt a hybrid regime. However, these tools should be used carefully only to 
accommodate the concerns of major economies—whose agreement is necessary for 
the function of the hybrid regime.38F38 Policymakers need to ask how much the 
cooperation of a specific low-tax country is necessary for a hybrid regime to work 
well, and how to best incentivize that country to align its tax policy with it. 
For example, small tax havens are unlikely to join any hybrid regime 
initiative, while other low-tax countries—e.g., Singapore and Ireland—are much more 
likely to comply with such a regime if it is adopted by their major trading partners. 
Assume a Canadian MNE that shifts its intangible assets to a Bermudian subsidiary, 
so that under ALS accounting its income is reported there. However, under the hybrid 
formulary-ALS regime, since most of the R&D and expenses associated with these 
intangibles were recognized in Canada, the income is sourced to Canada.   
Since Canada and Bermuda are unlikely to agree about how to allocate the 
MNE's residual, would this result in double taxation? Perhaps, but this type of double 
taxation would not disrupt international trade and therefore should not concern 
(Canadian) policymakers. That the same MNE income is recognized simultaneously 
in two different jurisdictions is not problematic—because the MNE income is not 
effectively taxed in Bermuda. High- and medium-tax countries have incentives to 
prevent double taxation only when there is real economic activity taking place. 
Bermuda is a financial offshore tax haven, and Bermudian firms are typically conduits 
to investments elsewhere. As a small group of islands, Bermuda has a limited ability 
to attract high volumes of real economic activity, which means that its agreement to 
the hybrid regime is unlikely and unnecessary.  
Low-tax jurisdictions, like Ireland and Singapore, benefit from income 
shifting under the current regime, but their decision about how to respond to a hybrid 
regime is much more complicated. The operating principle behind the formulary 
regime is that Ireland should be able to offer MNEs a low-tax rate on their activities in 
Ireland, but not a tax reduction on their activities elsewhere. Ireland may try to disrupt 
the establishment of a hybrid regime because it benefits from income shifting. 
However, Ireland also has a clear interest to be able to use its low corporate income 
tax rates to attract real investments. Hence, if Ireland's major trading partners (e.g., 
Britain, France, Germany, and the United States) adopt a (lightly coordinated) hybrid 
regime, the Irish government would likely face competing incentives: to try and keep 
its tax advantage as a location for income shifting, or its advantages as a location 
where real businesses could be conducted with low risk of double taxation. Since 
prophecy is the dominion of fools, predicting what the Irish government would decide 
is not advisable. However, one could predict that it would face significant pressures to 
adopt a tax regime that is compatible with the conventions of its major trading 
partners.  
For a hybrid regime to be operative, it is enough if a critical mass of countries 
that includes some of the major developed and emerging economies accepts the need 
for such a regime. A lot could be done with a far less than perfectly coordinated 
                                                 
38 In theory, all tax policies could be implemented unilaterally. However, some of the benefits 
associated with shifting to formulary apportionment (e.g., lower administrative costs and more coherent 
allocation of MNEs' residual income) may require some coordination among states. These "network" 
benefits of coordination should be weighted against the costs of buyouts. Our point is that while the 
costs of buying the cooperation of big industrialized countries such as China may be big, so would the 
benefits. On the other hand, the benefits of buying the agreement of small haven countries would be 
small while the costs of buying their agreements are expected to be high.  
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international tax regime so that waiting for such a perfect regime, while enduring the 
problems of the current regime, is both futile and costly.  
 
 
Myth #6: Formulary Apportionment would Increase the Tax Rate on MNEs and 
Result in a Shift of Productive Assets to Low-Tax Jurisdictions 
 
UThe Myth: 
 
The proposed hybrid regime would increase the effective tax rate on MNEs' 
residual sources of income to which the formulary apportionment would be applied. 
In an open economy, higher tax rates on mobile income are inefficient. Admittedly, 
there are many limitations on MNEs' ability to shift productive assets and jobs to tax 
havens such as the Cayman Islands. However, allocation by formula would likely 
result in a shift of productive assets to low-tax jurisdictions such as Ireland, 
Singapore, and Estonia. A hybrid regime would make it difficult for high-tax 
jurisdictions to maintain mobile activities such as R&D activity and investment in 
intangibles—which are key to economic growth, jobs and development. Such a 
regime would therefore increase tax distortions over the efficient allocation of capital, 
induce sovereigns to engage in tax competition, or raise significant opposition so that 
it is politically unsustainable. 
 
UThe Prospect 
 
The proposal for a hybrid regime refers to the proper allocation of MNE 
income. It does not have anything to do with the general effective tax rate on MNEs 
or with the effective tax rate on their mobile activities. This paper concerns itself 
neither with the proper tax rate that should be laid by source jurisdictions, nor with the 
wisdom of imposing a source income tax on mobile activities. These questions are 
political, so that they should be determined by countries in a way that satisfies their 
preferences.  
For example, consider a MNE like Intel that conducts manufacturing and 
R&D in Israel and Germany. Israel is a country that has a very high-quality labor 
force for R&D projects. Its treasury officials may therefore assign high priority to 
diversifying its labor market and develop some mid-tech manufacturing facilities. On 
the other hand, officials in Germany may think the country has enough mid-tech 
manufacturing facilities and needs to further enhance its R&D labor market. Hence, 
once Intel's income is allocated, Israel may tax the income generated by the mid-tech 
manufacturing activity at low (or even negative) rates, while taxing the income 
generated by the R&D activity at a different (higher) rate. Germany, of course, would 
probably do exactly the opposite. The hybrid formulary-ALS allocation system does 
not dictate a change in the effective tax laid on MNEs—it only changes the integrity 
of the income allocation system.  
This paper is concerned with the difficulty of assigning MNE income—which 
is analytically separate from the question of the rate in which should it be taxed. 
Governments should subsidize MNE activities which they think have positive 
externalities. Subsidies can take many tax and non-tax forms—and this paper does not 
address the question of how to tailor a tax subsidy to best encourage otherwise 
socially underprovided commercial activities. The paper does contend, however, that 
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granting a subsidy in the form of the ALS-based transfer pricing rules is wrong and 
misleading. 
A hybrid allocation regime would require governments to be transparent with 
respect to their distributive and revenue preferences. For example, an ALS regime 
allows manipulation with respect to intangibles and therefore could be seen as a 
subsidy for their production. However, if a certain government believes that R&D 
activity should be encouraged through tax subsidies, then there is no reason to limit 
this subsidy to MNEs that can manipulate the transfer pricing regime to attain lower 
taxes. If policymakers further believe that certain MNEs provide special benefits and 
know-how, which merits a special tax subsidy, they should convey this message 
clearly to their voters.39F39 The ALS subsidy to MNEs is wasteful, because it requires 
MNEs to expend resources on unproductive tax planning activities. 40F40 In a competitive 
environment, even productive and honest MNEs would need to engage in tax shifting 
manipulation.  
Before concluding, a number of issues should be made clear. The question of 
formulary allocation touches upon a number of unsettled issues in tax policy. There 
are big question marks about whether source income taxes should be laid at all, 
whether a corporate income tax is a proper fiscal instrument, and whether countries 
should be concerned with the equity implications of taxing returns to capital at all 
instead of directing their fiscal policy to promote higher rates of growth and 
employment.  
This paper's framework cannot address all these issues. Instead, it assumes that 
countries' tax preferences roughly align with their tax legislation—so that a corporate 
income tax is imposed as a source business-profit tax. This source tax is not 
inefficient, but, like other regulatory requirements, reflects the cost of doing business 
in a specific jurisdiction. MNEs should take these tax costs into account before 
investing in a country—exactly in the same way that they take other costs (e.g., labor 
regulation) into account. Put differently, this paper's framework does not question the 
wisdom of the system currently in place and the proper composition of the tax mix. It 
assumes this system reflects the preferences of voters and is concerned with how to 
best manage it by providing some thoughts about how an alternative (fairer, more 
transparent, and easier to comply with) MNE allocation regime could be established.  
  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Paper's analysis strongly suggests that adopting a hybrid formulary-ALS 
regime could be a viable, practical and political option. Pursuing this option does not 
require policymakers to reformulate the basic structure of the current international tax 
regime. Instead, it suggests that  policymakers continue the already existing trends 
with respect to the hard-to-tax sources of MNE income, which involve shifting from 
                                                 
39 Some may find our position to be naïve in light of the real world political economy of tax policy. We 
believe, however, that in a democratic regime, where the policies generated by elected representatives 
should, at least in some crude way, reflect voter preferences. Hence arguing that the ALS tax-subsidy is 
good because (like many other tax subsidies) it allows policymakers to hide what they are actually 
doing, is not really a challenge to our position. In essence, such a view amounts to a fundamental 
criticism of the democratic decision making—an issue which is (well) beyond the scope of this paper. 
40 It also provides MNEs with an awkward set of incentives. Intel, for example, specializes in the 
production of computer chips and it should be rewarded for its expertise by the market, and perhaps 
also by governments if its functions generate positive externalities. This reward should not be 
conditioned on Intel's willingness to engage in aggressive tax-shifting planning. 
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the ALS towards more a formulary arrangements. It claims, however, that to better 
reduce the costs of the current regime this approach should have a more concrete 
sense of direction, be explicit and structured.  
The table below summarizes the comparative advantages of the hybrid regime 
over the current regime.  
 
 A COMPARED ANALYSIS OF THE ARTICLE’S HYBRID REGIME WITH CURRENT 
TRANSFER PRICING TECHNIQUES 
 
 
 
 
ALS Transfer 
Pricing 
Hybrid  
Formulary –
ALS Regime 
Precisely penetrates how MNEs derive income. X X 
Can benefit from, but does not require, a 
harmonized international corporate tax base.  √ √ 
Can benefit from, but does not require, a 
multilateral tax agreement. √ √ 
Can be promoted under an ALS title. 
 √ √ 
Involves some, but not high, risks of excessive 
double taxation. √ √ 
Adopts ALS conventions when there are easy to 
observe and consistently priced market 
comparables. 
√ √ 
Deviates from traditional ALS conventions with 
respect to the hard-to-tax sources of MNE income. √ √ 
Has administrative and compliance costs 
associated with valuation and the need to 
distinguish between different sources of income. 
√ √ 
Allows MNEs to freely exercise their intra-group 
ownership and financial structures. √ √ 
Allows avoiding administrative and compliance 
costs associated with the need to draft, document 
and scrutinize intra MNE contractual 
arrangements. 
X √ 
Prevents/reduces income shifting.  
 X √ 
Provides systematic, transparent, and consistent 
enforcement. 
 
X √ 
Does not reward (artificial paper shuffling) tax 
planning. 
 
X √ 
Prevents the erosion of the corporate tax base (as a 
source jurisdiction tax). X √ 
Increases effective corporate income tax rates on 
MNE activities in source jurisdictions X 
NA 
(irrelevant) 
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The above table suggests that formulary arrangements offer a real non-utopian 
policy alternative and that ignoring this has prevented the advancement of the 
international income tax regime. Persuaded that they are deadlocked, policymakers 
and tax authorities have encumbered the tax regime with ineffective and costly ALS-
based rules. However, as the analysis of this paper demonstrates, adhering to the ALS 
becomes increasingly absurd as the volume and sophistication of affiliated 
transactions continues to increase.  Furthermore, the vulnerability of the current 
transfer pricing system to the shifting of income based on intangibles ownership and 
risk-bearing makes necessary numerous additional complexities in the international 
tax system. For example, transfer pricing vulnerabilities probably constitute the most 
pressing argument against adoption of a territorial tax system in the United States. An 
effective transfer pricing reform could therefore tip the policy-making balance in 
favor of adopting a territorial system, which would allow the elimination of grossly 
complex foreign tax credit system for active income. The current transfer pricing 
system therefore can in some respects be seen as the tail that wags the dog, which 
prevents the development of a more simple, efficient, transparent and equitable 
international tax regime. 
Changes in the global economy require that policymakers adopt the best 
method to allocate income generated by MNE activity. This paper hopefully showed 
that with respect to MNEs residual income certain low cost incremental shifts from 
the current regime towards more formulary arrangements could offer many benefits.  
For years transfer pricing policy has been a battlefield with advocates of the 
ALS and formulary apportionment sitting on each side of the barricade. This paper 
contends that after decades of stagnation the barricade should be finally dismantled. 
The costs of the current regime are real and growing—addressing them in an open 
minded realistic way is therefore not an academic privilege but an acute necessity.  
We believe that the time has come for OECD and policymakers in other major 
developed and emerging economies to take the lead on exploring how new ideascan 
better allocate the MNE income tax base.  
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